Introduction
In the canonical principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, a risk-neutral principal is unable to observe the action undertaken by the risk-averse agent, but she is able to observe the outcome that is generated through a combination of Nature and the agent's input. In this note, I am interested in a somewhat different setup: the principal observes action, but the observation is done through a device that returns a binary message and can garble the information it observes. I use the word "device" in this paper to distance the reader from the idea of a technology as used in the complete contracts literature, which assumes unobserved action. A survey of that literature and interesting results can be found in Silvers [1] . The general impetus for this paper is Holmstrom [2] , which would suggest that such a device, no matter how imperfectly it functions, serves the principal when it provides any information on the unobserved actions.
I simplify the setup and focus on providing a metric for the cost of this device related to the efficiency of the device and, thus, the number of observations that the principal would have to make when using such a device.
R E T R A C T E D
Being able to derive a cost in this manner is thus a contribution to the literature that suggests that some contractual adjustments might mitigate shirking, though in a context where observing actions trumps observing outcomes. This needs justification. While it is true that a principal may not even wish to acquire information on the actions of the agent 1 , it is also entirely conceivable that she might. Indeed, in several settings, this makes patent sense. One can readily imagine an R & D unit, for example, where there may not be any noteworthy outcome for long periods of time, but the actions of each individual researcher in the innovation project matter.
The principal's monitoring device is rarely perfect in practice; there is always the potential that the device provides imperfect, garbled feedback. I show that as the principal's device becomes more reliable-and there is less misinformation from its use in the observation of the agent-the best outcome feasible improves. In a world tending towards fully state-contingent contracts, this much is perhaps fairly intuitive. Interestingly, when the principal's observation mechanism makes more observations of the employee's actions, the latter is permitted to undertake more actions and this can reduce the principal's best possible outcome. This observation is potentially also relevant to the puzzle of the ubiquity of incomplete contracts observed in practice. For example, Hart and Moore [4] propose the idea of contracts serving as reference points in an exchange between a buyer and a seller, settling ambiguity over the type of performance that a principal might expect from an agent; Fehr, Hart and Zehnder [5] experimentally provide support, suggesting that rigidity in the contracts had the effect of emphasizing the reference point more clearly compared to flexible terms, and thereby suffered from much less ex post regret and shading. In the context of this paper, a "rigid" contract comprises one where the principal makes more observations with a more reliable device, and a flexible contract would entail the principal making several observations, each with error, permitting the employee more opportunities to shade within the scope of the contract.
In the next section, I present the model by first characterizing the device that the principal employs in the monitoring process, followed by a derivation of results on the principal's maximum feasible outcome under both scenarios. I then provide a discussion of the model before making some concluding observations.
Model
Let us imagine a principal and an agent with objective functions 1 u and 2 u , and with action sets A and B respectively. Assume that the action sets are compact and that the objective functions are continuous from A B × →  . We assume that the principal moves first, however prior to her outcome being determined she has a monitoring device of fixed effectiveness that she can use to ascertain some information about the agent's action. The principal uses the device s times in evaluating the agent's action b B ∈ . Assume that the device delivers a message comprising a binary response on the agent's action for the principal. Thereafter, the principal makes her choice of action a A ∈ based upon a state-contingent plan that acts as an ex ante mapping between the readings of her screening device and her action set.
The Monitoring Device
Assume that a proportion q s of the total observations that the principal wishes to make using the device are garbled, with q s < , and that the principal is aware of this shortcoming. Thus, each tranche of s observations comprises 2s subsets in the space of the agent's action set, (
where the set 1 g P represents those actions for which the agent is observed displaying a positive behavior and, likewise, 0 g P represents the negative behavior situations, each at observation g. Note that . Once the principal receives the results she selects an action, a A κ ∈ . Therefore, the principal's strategy can be defined as depending on the 2s sets as in Equation (1) 1 See, for example, Crémer [3] .
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that satisfy Equation (2) 
. . Note that the agent's outcome is determined only by his actions and the error of device. Naturally it matters what the agent knows about the device, considering it either free of errors or has some prior over the extent of garble and is risk-averse in his choice of action. I consider the former case since, for our purposes, the material argument is unaltered and the analysis is simplified.
Let us assume that, for the agent, there is no uncertainty at the time of selecting his action since he aware of the principal's action and assumes that the device has no errors. The principal acts on the assumption that the agent selects an action from a set of responses ( ), a Θ  , defined as follows: 
Garbled Results
Consider now the errors in the device causing a garbled result as read by the principal. The errors lead the principal to read
. This error carries a real cost to the principal's outcome that cannot be lower than Note that the case where the device does not garble the results for any observations the principal's maximum
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outcome does not depend on the efficiency of the device. This is obviously not the case in the presence of garbling. Nevertheless, we can show the following:
Proposition 1. If we define a distance function, υ , providing a one-to-one mapping over the binary observations set S, then the principal's outcome is invariant to the strategies ( ),
a  or ( ) In finding the principal's strategy this then permits us to consider a smaller set of strategies for which ( ), a Θ  is met, for which the agent's outcome 
Theorem. The principal's maximum feasible outcome using a monitoring device with garbled results is the solution that minimizes
Proof. Since ( ) q β µ is decreasing and continuous, if it is strictly positive then it must be the case that there is an action for the principal ( ), a  that ensures that her outcome is larger than µ . Say that we select some 
In relation to κ construct sets 
Discussion
Let's step back to look at the result. Obviously, when there is a given amount of garbling in the device and q + times and because of garbling we get true responses to more than half observations. In other words, we define 
, , , , , , We know that for each action undertaken by the agent it would be true that ( 
Concluding Remarks
It is worth underscoring the fundamental tension that forms the thrust of the argument in this note: as the number
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of possible errors in observation reduces, the garble-adjusted information generated by the principal's monitoring device naturally increases too, and, therefore, the maximum feasible outcome for the principal increases. As the number of observation instances increase, the agent's set of feasible actions expands, and this reduces the maximum feasible outcome. The analysis in this paper suggests a possibility of using a particular class of monitoring technologies in a principal-agent context where the bias arises from a device that can be considered "unbiased", in that garbling is not a function of the message. The problem is in some sense simpler than the usual context where strategic behavior by the agent is an important and integral component of the analysis; in a manner of speaking, the agent too may have a monitoring device over the principal's actions simultaneously.
